|
|
|
           |
 |
Wisconsin Wisconsin State Bar E-92-3 A contingent fee contract as collateralfor a personal loan to a lawyer. FactsAssume Attorney A, a sole practitioner, and an individual, Client B, executea valid personal injury written contingency agreement under SCR 20:1.5(c). Assume further that the written agreement provides for an attorney’s lien con-sistent with SCR 20:1.8(j)(1) and (2). Disregarding the value of the contingencycase or the contingent fee, may Attorney A ethically offer, tender or negotiate theattorney’s lien in Client B’s case as collateral, assignment or guarantee for apersonal loan that Attorney A seeks for himself? Would the answer differ if the proposed lender was a sophisticated commercial lending institution or another party who has no experience as a lender?OpinionUnder no circumstances may a lawyer use a contingent fee contract with aclient as security for a personal loan to the lawyer. SCR 20:1.8(j)(2) permits alawyer to ‘‘contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case’’;but SCR 20:1.8(j)(intro) otherwise prohibits a lawyer’s acquisition of ‘‘a pro-prietary interest in the cause of action or the subject matter of litigation the lawyeris conducting. . . .’’ A lawyer’s securing a personal loan with a contingent feecontract would violate this general prohibition as well as the basis for it. Asstated in the ‘‘comment’’ to SCR 20:1.8(j), the basis for the rule is in commonlaw champerty and maintenance. Because a lawyer’s acquiring a personal loan in the manner proposed would make the lawyer an interested investor in his orher client’s cause of action, the general prohibition of SCR 20:1.8(j) therefore isimplicated.Furthermore, ‘‘(i)f there were a market for buying and selling causes ofaction, contingent fees would probably not be necessary. Injured parties couldsell their claims in that market and use the funds to hire lawyers. But such amarket is prohibited by laws that ban champertous exchanges and limit theassignability of causes of action. Banks, lacking assignable security, thus cannot justify lending funds for legal fees on the unsecured hope that a statistical likelihood of recovering will pay off the loan.’’ (Emphasis supplied.) Wolfram,Modern Legal Ethics, p. 528 (1986). Finally, a client’s right to discharge his or her lawyer renders a contingentfee contract an inappropriate form of collateral. The actual or potential impactof the proposed conduct could well affect the lawyer’s representation of the clientand the lawyer’s exercise of independent professional judgment. SCR 20:1.7(b),SCR 20:1.8(a) and SCR 20:2.1. For all of the reasons stated above, the committee disapproves the proposedconduct. FORMAL OPINIONSE-92-3© July 1998, State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books pg 446-447Opinion No E-92-3 PDF Back to the Ethics Map |
|
|
|
| National Lawsuit Funding LLC | ||
| 333 Naamans Road Suite 15A | ||
| Claymont, DE 19703 | ||
| Phone: | (302) 792-1400; (888) 322-2400 | |
| Fax: | (302) 792-1800 | |
| E-mail: |  |
|
National Lawsuit Funding ::: Legal Funding ::: Lawsuit Loan ::: Attorney Lawsuit Loans ::: Site Map
Commercial litigation Funding ::: Consultants and Brokers ::: Attorney Questionnaire ::: Testimonials
Attorney Update Form ::: Workers Compensation ::: Structured Settlement ::: Ethics Law ::: Contact NLF
National Lawsuit Funding was last updated on Friday May 09, 2008.